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Abstract
The last thirty years in the analysis of inequality and poverty, especially in developing
countries, has seen two phases—a phase of conceptual advancement, followed by a
phase of application and policy debate.  Both phases were exciting and useful in their
own way, but the applied phase has significantly exhausted the potential of the
conceptual advances of two decades ago, and new advances have been few and far
between.  However, there is now a need, and an opening, for a new phase of
conceptual advances, advances that will make use of shifting methodological terrain
in mainstream economics, and that will answer emerging policy questions that would
otherwise have no easy answers (or, perhaps, too easy answers).
                                                                
* Introductory comments at the Cornell Conference on Conceptual Challenges in Poverty and Inequality,
April 16-17, 2002: http://www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/kanbur/ConceptualChallenges.pdf.  These
comments were intended to kick off the discussion with some suggestions for conceptual challenges.  The
keynote speakers at the Cornell conference: Francois Bourguignon, Douglas Massey, Martha Nussbaum,
Amartya Sen and William Julius Wilson highlighted many other areas where conceptual advances were
needed.  I am grateful to Kaushik Basu, Gary Fields, David Grusky and Dick Miller for discussions on this
topic over the last year.
21. Introduction
It is a pleasure to welcome the distinguished participants, and especially our
guests from outside Cornell, to this conference on Conceptual Challenges in Poverty and
Inequality.  The title encapsulates the organizers’ intent for this multidisciplinary
gathering.  We would like to flush out the major conceptual issues that need addressing in
the analysis of poverty, inequality and distributional questions generally, as an input into
the pressing problems of policy design and implementation.  Such an exercise, we feel,
would help to set an agenda in this area for the social sciences and cognate disciplines, an
agenda to which disciplines could contribute in their own particular way, singly or in
concert. These opening comments reflect brief observations by one member of one sub-
discipline.  But they may help to indicate some of the issues that we might end up
discussing in this conference.
2. The Last Thirty Years
I want to begin by a characterization, perhaps controversial, of the last thirty years
of research on distributional questions in economics, development economics in
particular.  Somewhat arbitrarily, let me focus on the period beginning with Tony
Atkinson’s classic 1970 paper “On the Measurement of Inequality”, and ending with
Tony Atkinson and Francois Bourguignon’s state of the art edited survey volume of
2000, “Handbook of Income Distribution.”  I would like to argue that this period can be
divided, very roughly, into two periods: the 1970’s through to the mid 1980’s, and the
mid-1980’s through to the end of last century.  In my view, the first fifteen years were a
period of great conceptual leaps and ferment and were exciting for that reason.  The
second fifteen years, no less exciting, were the years of consolidation, application and
fierce policy debates, especially on the distributional consequences of macroeconomic
policies in developing and transition economies.  Let me elaborate on this
characterization.
2.1  The First Phase: Conceptual Ferment
There are at least four areas where the literature of the 1970’s and early 1980’s
made basic conceptual advances or raised basic conceptual questions in economics—the
measurement of inequality and poverty, the debate on utilitarianism, gender and
intrahousehold issues, and social interactions in the generation of poverty.  Let us take
each one of these in turn.
It is difficult to overestimate the electric effect that Tony Atkinson’s 1970 paper,
or Amartya Sen’s 1973 book “On Economic Inequality,” or Sen’s 1976 paper, “Poverty:
An Ordinal Approach to Measurement,” had when they appeared.  They provided a way
into conceptualizing and operationalizing value judgments on distributional issues, and
by doing so acted as an antidote to a natural instinct among economists to avoid
distributional questions, an instinct that goes back to debates in the 1930s launched by
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of these papers in the 1970’s sparked a huge discussion on how exactly to incorporate
distributional value judgments. In the measurement of poverty, the culmination of this
process was undoubtedly the famous paper by James Foster, Joel Greer and Erik
Thorbecke in 1984, “A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures.”  This measure, which
has some claim to be called the “Cornell measure” of poverty, has now become the
workhorse of applied work on poverty the world over.
Amartya Sen’s name is also associated with the second major category conceptual
ferment of the 1970’s and 1980s.  This was the time when interaction with philosophical
discourse enriched economist’s perspectives on distribution dramatically.  James
Mirrlees’s 1971 Nobel Prize winning paper, “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum
Income Taxation,” is famous for many reasons, including the fact that it was an
application of thoroughgoing Utilitarianism to the policy question of how progressive
income taxation should be.  The shortcomings of such Utilitarian fundamentalism were
highlighted by Sen in a number of well-known works, including his 1987 book “The
Standard of Living.”  But the 1970s were also the time of Rawls and Nozick. Nobel Prize
winning economist Kenneth Arrow introduced Rawls to mainstream economists in terms
they would understand—maxi-min strategies in the face of uncertainty (behind the
Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” people would rationally support the constitution that aimed
for the greatest good of the worst off since, “but for the grace of God”, any one of them
could be the worst off).  New journals such as Economics and Philosophy were started,
and journals such as Philosophy and Public Affairs had contributions from economists
and philosophers.
The 1970s and early 1980s were also a time when economists began to make the
conceptual leaps necessary to bring processes of social interaction to understand
economic phenomena in general, and poverty and inequality in particular.  Staying within
the rational choice framework, but taking the issues of imperfect and asymmetric
information seriously, George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joe Stiglitz launched a body
of work, which won them the Nobel Prize in 2001.  Akerlof and Stiglitz, in particular,
saw this framework as helping economists analyze such phenomena as the underclass in
developed economies, or lack of investment in education by the poorest of the poor in
developing countries.  It was argued that in the presence of imperfect and asymmetric
information, the market economy can produce multiple equilibria, some more efficient
and more equitable than others, and that public action and intervention was necessary to
move from the “bad” equilibria.
As a final example of the conceptual ferment on distributional issues in
economics and development economics, gender and intrahousehold questions were put
firmly on the agenda.  The leading name here is again Sen; in the 1970s and early 1980s
in a series of publications (with titles like “Family and Food: Sex Bias in Poverty”) that
brought home to economists that our “unitary” models of the household simply could not
capture or explain the evidence on deprivation among females in developing countries.
While slow to get off the ground, this line of enquiry gradually blossomed conceptually
and led on to applied and policy analysis.
42.2  The Second Phase: Consolidation, Application and Policy Debate
My contention is that from the early to mid-1980’s onwards the conceptual
ferment on distributional issues died down and we went into a phase of consolidation,
application and policy debate.  I do not in any way want to suggest that this second phase
was less useful or less exciting—just that it was different.
The various inequality and poverty indices were systematically applied to data
sets in rich and poor countries.  Indeed, for developing countries this period was
characterized by a significantly increased availability of household survey data sets.  In
Africa, for example, the first modern high quality nationally representative household
survey data set dates from 1985 (for Cote d’Ivoire), and now there are more than a dozen
countries that have at least one such survey—indeed for half a dozen African countries
there are panels where the same households are surveyed two years in a row.  This
increase in data availability shows no sign of abatement, with the result that the measures
developed in the 1970s and 1980s will have plenty of applications in the years to come.
And each new survey will lead to empirical debates about the nature and extent of
poverty and inequality in the country in question.
Similarly, the literature on intrahousehold and gender issues has progressed to
consolidation and application. In 1995 a group of us wrote a paper entitled “Unitary
versus Collective Models of the Household: Is it Time to Shift the Burden of Proof?” and
gave an affirmative answer to our own rhetorical question.  There is of course still strong
resistance from the profession’s basic reliance on the “unitary” model.  But the debate is
now on the details of this or that empirical test, not on whether factors such as
intrahousehold bargaining between the genders in principle have a role to play.  The
asymmetric information literature is now part of standard graduate courses, and basic
texts in development economics, such as that by Kaushik Basu, “Analytical Development
Economics,” very much use this perspective to frame much of the discussion of
underdevelopment.  Finally, the interaction between economic and philosophical
discourses has also “normalized”, in the sense that much Kuhnian “normal science” is
seen in the papers in the new journals that were founded two decades or so ago.  But
some sort of an equilibrium has been reached.  While all economists would know exactly
what was meant by the term “Rawlsian objective function”, “big ideas” in philosophy do
not seem to animate graduate students in the same way as they did twenty or thirty years
ago.
It is not that there has been no ferment on distributional issues in economics and
in development economics in the last fifteen to twenty years.  But it has been not so much
on the conceptual as on the policy front. In the wake of the oil price shocks of the 1970’s,
many developing countries in the 1980s adopted—or, depending on your point of view,
were forced to adopt by a cartel of International Financial Institutions—programs of
“structural adjustment”.  These programs, primarily introduced in Latin America and in
Africa, contained the key elements of “the Washington Consensus”—including opening
up economies to trade and capital flows and reducing the role the state in the economy.
The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 ushered in “transition” to market economies for
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also adopted, or were forced to adopt, similar policy packages.  Finally, in the late 1990s
the world was hit by a series of financial crises, which many laid at the door of these
same policies, especially deregulation of financial markets and flows.  All of the above
have now perhaps been subsumed under a general (and generally unhelpful) catchall
heading of the debate on “globalization.”
The debates of the last fifteen years in development economics have crystallized
around the consequences of these policies and these developments, particularly for
poverty and inequality (see my 2001 paper, “Economic Policy, Distribution and Poverty:
The Nature of Disagreements”).  The conceptual advances of the first fifteen years,
particularly in the measurement of poverty and inequality, have of course been put to
good use, especially as new data sets have become available.  The debate has been fierce,
with the term “Washington Consensus” acquiring the status of a term of abuse in some
quarters.  But, including the general and vague “markets versus state” issue that figures
large in most exchanges, it has hardly led to or involved strikingly new conceptual
questions—at least not from the economic perspective.  The economic questions that
abound in these debates—Is economic growth good for the poor?  Is trade openness
equitable and efficient? What exchange rate regime leads to least unemployment? Is
international capital cartelized around the leadership of the Bretton Woods
Institutions?—important as they are, do not seem to call forth major conceptual advances
in the core of economics any more than normal.  Fiercely debated?  Yes.  Conceptual
Ferment?  No.
2.3  A New Conceptual Ferment? Some Possibilities.
In my view, the last fifteen years have not been one of conceptual ferment in the
economic analysis of poverty and inequality—distributional analysis more generally.
This is certainly true compared to the fifteen years before, when new questions and new
techniques, and new perspectives from the interaction with philosophy, framed a lively
decade and a half.  The last decade and a half has also been exciting, but in a different
way—through application of the previous advances, but also through a highly charged
policy debate.
Will the next fifteen years resemble the last fifteen, or the fifteen before?  It is
unlikely that the policy debates will disappear, although some of the passions may calm
as at least some consensus develops. But what about conceptual ferment?  Where will
that come from?  In this section I tentatively suggest three candidates for topics or
questions in the distributional area that may well spark the conceptual excitement of three
decades ago—measurement of poverty with differential mortality rates; behavioral
economics foundations of poverty and inequality analysis; and dealing with
multidimensionality of poverty and the standard of living.  Like all good questions, these
are not new.  They have been asked before, even recently. But in my view they are
examples of questions that could trigger the conceptual advances and debates of the next
decade or two.
63.1 Poverty and Death
As AIDS cuts its destructive swathe through Africa, its distributional profile may
be changing.  Increasingly, it is becoming clear that it afflicts the rural poor, and these are
the ones who will be least able to afford the pharmaceutical drugs necessary for
controlling its symptoms.  Without getting into a debate on the epidemiology of the
disease, I would only ask us to consider the possibility that the poor will die
disproportionately from this disease in Africa in the decades to come.  It would be a
monstrous assault on our fundamental intuitions if these deaths were not recorded on the
negative side of the ledger in any sort of social assessment.  And yet the fact of the matter
is that the most commonly used family of poverty measures, the “Cornell measure”
discussed above, would decrease if the poorest person died as a result of poverty.
The technical-mathematical reason for why this happens is simple and obvious—
removing the poorest person from the count lowers poverty as measured.  But fixing this
problem is not simply a technical matter.  Somehow or the other we wish to keep track of
the information that a poor person has died because of poverty in the past, in assessing
the poverty of the present.  But poor people also die from factors that are nothing to do
with poverty—in the sense that with these factors mortality is not above the average for
the population as a whole.  So, in a sense, we have to keep track of all lives lived and
why they died. And how far back do we go?  From AIDS to the Partition of India and
Pakistan?  The Great Fire of London? The Black Death?
Of course practical considerations of data will soon put a stop to whimsy in
empirical work. But the issue raised here is not empirical.  It is conceptual.  Current
conceptualizations of poverty measurement focus (somewhat unthinkingly) on those
currently alive, whereas adult death rates from AIDS will force us to consider the lives
extinguished of those who have just died.  Our conceptual tools do not seem to be
adequate to the task.  While we might get considerable help from an earlier literature
(which goes back to the 1970s and early 1980s) on Utilitarianism and population policy
(many will recall the debate over Derek Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion”), I think new
tools will have to be developed to address these concerns, and several deep questions
may be broached in the development of these tools.
3.2 Behavioral Economics, Development Economics and Distributional
Economics
Surveying the development of the last few years in economics, the journalist
Louis Uchitelle of the New York Times (February 11, 2001) wrote of the late 1990’s that
“Behavioral economics had finally arrived: a discipline that for a half-century had built
its theories on the rigid assumption that people acted with rational, unemotional self-
interest had formally recognized that human beings had another, feisty, side to
them…And if the behaviorists prevail, the mainstream view of a rational, self-regulating
economy may well be amended and policies adopted to control irrational, sometimes
destructive behavior.”  This journalistic recognition went hand in hand with professional
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Medal—a biennial award to the best American economist under 40 that is proving to be a
safe predictor of future Nobel Prize awards—to Matthew Rabin of Berkeley, Behavioral
Economics can be said truly to have come in from the cold. The work of a generation of
scholars working in this vein, including Cornell’s Bob Frank and (formerly Cornell’s but
now) Chicago’s Dick Thaler has in turn been honored by the newfound recognition given
to Behavioral Economics.
Interestingly, while the behavioral economists were toiling away to question the
assumptions of basic rational choice theory, development economists and distributional
economists, including myself, were rushing to embrace the central tenets of
microeconomic analysis, to move their sub disciplines (kicking and screaming, as they
saw it) into the “modern” era.  In development economics, the insights and analysis of
Arthur Lewis and Gunnar Myrdal were dropped and sometimes disparaged.  In the policy
realm, simple competitive supply and demand economics was the foundation for the
“Washington Consensus policy package” discussed earlier.  In the analytical realm,
development economists searched for “microfoundations” through “rigorous” models.
True, the best among them converged on the models and insights that flowed form the
imperfect information paradigm of Akerlof and Stiglitz, but these did not depart from the
rational choice frame in any strong sense. In a companion article to the Uchitelle piece,
Roger Lowenstein describes Dick Thaler’s work approvingly as follows: “Thaler and a
trio of colleagues went on to document that cabdrivers stop working for a day when they
reach a target level of income”.  But the young Turk development economists of the last
twenty years found the same assumptions about peasants or informal sector workers in
developing countries, by anthropologists and older development economists, to be
“irrational behavior” and therefore not worthy of incorporation into their models.
The same observations can be made about economists working on distributional
matters.  As I have argued in my 2002 paper, “Economics, Social Science and
Development,” mainstream economics has been characterized by a combination of
distributional sensitivity and an appreciation of the “the genius of the market”, the latter
flowing from the basic economic models based on rational choice and competitive
markets.  Those measuring poverty have, implicitly if not explicitly, taken a rational
choice perspective. This is captured most vividly in the standard way of operationalizing
well-being in empirical work—a simple sum of expenditures on consumption goods.
There are some adjustments, to be sure, for public goods.  But there are none for public
bads.  Thus, for example, a ceteris paribus increase in expenditure on addictive goods like
cigarettes would count as an increase in well-being.  If this increase happens for poor
households, measured poverty would decline!  And this is not just an out of the way
example—the biggest increases in smoking are occurring in the developing world,
especially in Asia.
At the very least, the smoking example highlights a paradox—at the same time
that the World Bank issues reports about the disastrous consequences of smoking among
the poor in developing countries, its poverty measures must treat this increase as a
contribution to reduction in poverty.  But, at a deeper level, the example issues a
8conceptual challenge to development economists and distributional economists.  We have
had a good run into the bosom of mainstream economics by adopting its rational choice
precepts.  But the mainstream itself is being questioned by behavioral economics.  What
does this mean for measurement for the poverty, and for the analysis of anti-poverty
policies?
3.3 How to Handle Multidimensionality of Poverty and Inequality?
The standard way economists think of and operationalize the standard of living is
in terms of income (or monetary value of consumption). Measures of inequality and
poverty are also thus primarily income based. In 1990 the late Mahbub ul Haq introduced
the well know Human Development Index (HDI) which is a weighted sum of three
components—income, literacy and life expectancy.  The way Amartya Sen tells the story,
he told Mahbub that the conceptual foundations of such a measure were very weak (sure
enough, within weeks of the measure coming out many economists, myself included,
attacked it on these grounds).  But Mahbub responded that such a measure would raise
issues of health and education on par with income in a way that nothing else could.  As
Sen has acknowledged, and as I acknowledge, Mahbub was right.  The annual publication
of the HDI is now an eagerly awaited event and invariably leads to debates within a
country through comparison with “competitor” countries (US versus Canada, India
versus Pakistan, Ghana versus Cote d’Ivoire, etc).  Its benefits in terms of raising
awareness at the highest policy levels has been incalculable, and it has been an integral
part of the policy debates discussed in the previous section.
But it still remains true that the conceptual foundations of the HDI are weak.  And
this is because the conceptual foundations for handling multidimensional poverty and
well-being are not yet strong enough to give confidence in the deployment of operational
measure such as the HDI.  If each of income, literacy and health improve, then we could
perhaps declare an overall improvement.  But what if there are movements in opposite
directions?  How are they to be aggregated to come up with an acceptable answer?  And
what is this thing that aggregation leads to?  Or should we start from the meta level and
define something into which each of these feeds as a component?  Once again, Sen has
provided a lead here in terms of his ideas on “capabilities”.  But it would be fair to say
that these ideas have not penetrated into the mainstream of poverty analysis among
economists—where simple estimation of the “Cornell measure” based on
income/expenditure is still very much the rule.  Bringing in education, health and risk as
key ingredients of well-being is happening slowly, but separately, dimension by
dimension, or simply as a subsidiary supplement to the income based measure.  Bringing
in other dimensions such as “voice” integrally seems a long way off.  Even in their
rational choice frame, perhaps especially in this frame, economists have not been as
successful as they might wish to be in conceptualizing and then operationalizing the
simultaneous evaluation of different dimensions of well-being, despite the remarkable
efforts of some.  There is a just a thought that perhaps releasing ourselves from the
straightjacket of rational choice, and moving to a more behavioral frame, might help in
this endeavor.
93. Conclusion
I have argued that the last thirty years in the analysis of inequality and poverty,
especially in developing countries, has seen two phases—a phase of conceptual
advancement, followed by a phase of application and policy debate. Both phases were
exciting and useful in their own way, but the applied phase has significantly exhausted
the potential of the conceptual advances of two decades ago, and new advances have
been few and far between.  However, there is now a need, and an opening, for a new
phase of conceptual advances, advances that will make use of the shifting methodological
terrain in mainstream economics, and that will answer emerging policy questions that
would otherwise have no easy answers (or, perhaps, too easy answers).
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